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  This paper presents a model of economic behavior that explicates the phenomenon known as 
“orderly marketing,” which was a main objective of the Marketing Orders agricultural pro-
gram introduced early in the New Deal. Recent analyses of marketing orders start with an im-
plicit assumption that there is no market failure—thus, that price regulation can cause only de-
viations from the first-best market solution. However, historical evidence suggests that disor-
derly marketing might refer to a kind of market imperfection. In the model presented here, a 
monopsonist processor sets a price to be paid, and an aggregate quantity to be purchased. In 
some states of the world, some farmers are excluded from the market. In other words, non-
price rationing can occur, and changes in consumer expenditure for the final product are ab-
sorbed by the processor rather than passed along to the farmer. The classified price and pool-
ing provisions of federal orders can lead to a Pareto improvement in welfare. 
 
  Key Words: disorderly marketing, market orders 
 
 
Agricultural programs can either be “predatory” 
—aimed at transferring income into the farm sec-
tor—or “productive”—aimed at correcting a mar-
ket failure (Rausser 1992). As economists have 
gained better insight into what kinds of market 
failures may exist—particularly market failures 
associated with imperfect information—it is use-
ful to revisit old debates and arguments in favor 
of agricultural programs to see whether assertions 
that programs are “in the public interest” are le-
gitimate assertions, or whether they are simply 
propaganda for predatory programs. 
  During the early decades of the twentieth cen-
tury, “orderly marketing” was a rallying cry of 
those concerned about the plight of the American 
farmer and the disparity of income between farm-
ers and their city brethren. Writing in 1937, Sam-
uel Herman called for government action to rec-
tify certain “evils that have arisen in the past con-
nected with the distribution of the economic re-
turn for farm products …[:] glutted and under-
supplied markets, unfair trade practices, and un-
fair methods of competition” (Herman 1937, p. 
400). The perceived “evils” referred to by Her-
man include non-price rationing—a situation in 
which farmers who are willing to sell at the pre-
vailing price are unable to make sales—and an 
inequitable distribution of consumer dollars be-
tween the farm sector and the processor. In the 
1930s, these concerns were addressed by the es-
tablishment of the Federal Market Order Pro-
gram. The stated objectives of the law authorizing 
marketing orders were to “establish … parity 
prices [to farmers]” and to “establish and main-
tain such orderly marketing conditions … as will 
provide, in the interests of producers and con-
sumers, an orderly flow of the supply thereof to 
market throughout its normal marketing season to 
avoid unreasonable fluctuations in supplies and 
prices.”
1 
  This paper looks at the Federal Milk Marketing 
Order program to see if an argument can be made 
that the programs were Pareto-improving. Al-
though marketing orders have been studied exten-
sively, they are typically analyzed as being a 
method used to increase farm prices. The studies 
implicitly assume that there is no inherent market 
failure that might justify marketing orders. Then 
the studies (i) estimate what prices and quantities 
                                                                                    
1 From the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, available 
online at the Legal Institute’s website, http://www4.law.cornell.edu/ 
uscode/7/602.html. 
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would prevail in the absence of marketing orders, 
(ii) estimate welfare measures with and without 
marketing orders, and (iii) use the difference as 
an estimate of the welfare costs of marketing or-
ders. For example, Gardner (2002, pp. 204–205) 
describes milk marketing orders as mechanisms 
for strengthening the bargaining power of coop-
eratives and increasing revenues to dairy farmers. 
But he notes that the higher revenues come at the 
expense of consumers and create significant dead-
weight losses. For other examples of this ap-
proach, see Dardis and Bedore (1990), Dobson 
and Salathe (1979), Masson and Eisenstat (1980), 
and Helmberger and Chen (1994). 
  By implicitly assuming that there is no underly-
ing market failure, this approach effectively ig-
nores the second objective of the legislation listed 
above—to maintain orderly marketing conditions. 
The conditions that could cause an unregulated 
market to exhibit “disorderly marketing” (or at 
least the widely held perception of disorderly 
marketing) have not been analyzed. This paper 
presents a more explicit formulation of those con-
ditions in order to improve our understanding of 
the impacts of marketing orders. 
  The contemporaneous literature reviewed in the 
next section makes it clear that “disorderly mar-
keting” is not an exact synonym for “low farm 
prices.” Following this review is a section that 
presents an analytical model in which “disorderly 
marketing” as described in the contemporaneous 
literature can rationally occur. The model has the 
following characteristics: a monopsonist proces-
sor enters into a contract (possibly an implicit 
contract) with farmers; the contract sets a price to 
be paid for the commodity, but also permits the 
processor to exclude some farmers from the mar-
ket; and in the optimal contract, non-price ration-
ing can occur, and changes in consumer expendi-
ture for the final product are absorbed by the 
processor rather than being passed along to the 
farmer. The section also presents a numerical 
example of a market with “disorderly marketing 
conditions.” The section after that discusses why 
alternative contracts or patterns of ownership may 
not emerge to eliminate the disorderly marketing 
conditions. That section also points out how the 
classified price and pooling provisions of federal 
orders can lead to a Pareto improvement in wel-
fare. The historical failure of cooperative market-
ing to solve disorderly marketing conditions is 
discussed in the context of the model. 
What Is Disorderly Marketing? 
 
In the early decades of the twentieth century, the 
term “orderly marketing” became associated with 
a farm movement led by Aaron Sapiro that en-
couraged formation of marketing cooperatives to 
bargain for higher farm prices (see Hamilton 
1991, Chapter 1, for a description). But the terms 
“orderly” and “disorderly” are descriptors of mar-
kets, and are not perfect synonyms for “high” and 
“low” farm prices. For example, in 1934, John 
Black made a distinction between “orderly mar-
keting” and increasing farm incomes: 
 
The Agricultural Adjustment Act clearly combines two 
distinct though not unrelated purposes. The first is to re-
adjust and reorganize the agriculture of the nation in 
such a manner as to free it from the evils of…disorderly 
marketing that have affected it in the past.…[T]he 
second objective of the program…[is] to provide im-
mediate relief from the acute distress…by the prolonged 
depression [Black 1934, p. 56]. 
 
  If the terms “orderly” and “disorderly” market-
ing are not equivalent to “high” and “low” farm 
prices, what do these terms mean? Waugh, Burtis, 
and Wolfe (1936) cited descriptions of disorderly 
marketing [“With perishable products, there may 
be a glut in one market while another market is 
undersupplied” (citing Converse 1935, p. 538)] 
and orderly marketing [“This is what is com-
monly called ‘orderly marketing’....The aim...is 
to put on the market each day, week, or month, 
just the amount which the market will absorb”
2 
(citing Clark and Weld 1932, p. 561)]. 
  Clearly, the perception of disorderly marketing 
grew out of unpredictability of demand and sup-
ply. For perishable products, price swings cannot 
be reduced through storage. In addition to the 
price swings, disorderly marketing also entailed a 
form of non-price rationing. In periods of rela-
tively abundant supply, some farmers were able 
to sell their output to the processor, while other 
farmers, willing to sell at the price paid by the 
processor, were excluded from the market, and 
were forced to sell on a secondary market. The 
existence of non-price rationing is demonstrated 
                                                                                    
2 Of course, unless market demand is perfectly inelastic, there is no 
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in this description of milk marketing:
3 “[Farmers] 
are often surprised, if not indignant, at having 
milk returned...while their neighbors meet with 
no such misadventure. Return of milk...occurs 
through efforts of dealers to relieve themselves of 
a surplus” [U.S. Department of Agriculture (1873), 
excerpted in Rasmussen (1975, p. 1446)]. 
  The existence (or perception) of non-price ra-
tioning is linked to the existence (or perception) 
of monopsony power on the part of processors. 
The political climate of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries was one in which con-
siderable attention was paid to economic power 
of large companies or trusts. In this political cli-
mate, non-price rationing no doubt made farmers 
feel that they were helpless to compete with the 
monopsony processors. Since there are farmers 
willing to sell at the price established by the proc-
essor, farmers who do sell perceive that they have 
no bargaining power. It is this element that is re-
ferred to variously as “cut-throat competition” 
(Garver and Trelogan 1936), “unfair trade prac-
tices” (Herman 1937), “unfair methods of com-
petition” (Herman 1937), and “unfair and dis-
criminatory trade practices” (U.S. General Ac-
counting Office 1985). 
  Clearly, a motivation for Sapiro’s cooperative 
movement (where the term “disorderly market-
ing” originated—see above) was to give some 
countervailing market power to farmers. The rea-
sons why cooperative marketing may fail as a 
solution to monopsony power are explained later 
in the paper. However, it is clear that the years 
leading up to the enactment of Federal Marketing 
Order legislation were a period of widespread 
concern about market power among processors of 
agricultural commodities. The growth in concen-
tration of monopsony power in the dairy industry 
was described by Brown (1928): “Since 1923, a 
significant number of...dealers have either dis-
continued their business or have merged with 
others.” Brown then warned against “abuses 
which monopoly makes possible” [Brown (1928, 
pp. 271–272), cited in Taylor and Taylor (1952, 
                                                                                    
3 During the late 1800s and early 1900s, milk marketing associations 
developed in an attempt to provide more order to milk markets. It was 
the failure of these associations that led most directly to agricultural 
marketing orders. However, to find a description of the market that is 
undisturbed by either regulation or marketing associations, it is neces-
sary to go back to the late 1800s. 
p. 739)].
4 The sense of inequitable treatment by 
the market was no doubt exacerbated by the fact 
that during periods of tight supply, the resulting 
higher consumer prices were not fully passed 




This section presents a model which is consistent 
with the above descriptions of disorderly mar-
keting. First we present “stylized facts” that de-
scribe the conditions in an unregulated market. 
Then we incorporate those stylized facts into a 
mathematical model of optimizing buyers and 
sellers. We use the model to show that optimizing 
behavior can lead to market outcomes that resem-
ble the descriptions of disorderly marketing. This 
lays the groundwork for exploring how price 
regulation—and in particular the classified pric-
ing and pooling type of regulation found in fed-
eral market orders—can lead to Pareto improve-
ments compared to the non-regulated market. 
  The stylized facts of a pre-regulatory milk mar-
ket
5 are these: 
 
▪    Farmers can produce a product in a high qual-
ity form (Grade A), or they can produce the 
product in a lower quality form (Grade B). The 
difference between Grade A and Grade B is 
that Grade A milk meets higher sanitary stan-
dards. The cost of producing Grade A is higher 
than the cost of producing Grade B. 
▪ Grade B is suitable only for processing into a 
storable good (cheese, for example). Grade A 
can be sold in a non-storable form (fluid milk), 
                                                                                    
4 Arguably, disorderly marketing conditions are even more likely in 
non-monopsony markets, since a monopsony internalizes what might 
otherwise be the externality of carrying surplus milk production in 
surplus months. Consider the situation described by Kriger (1998) for 
the New York City market in the 1930s. There, three large bottlers op-
erated effectively as a cartel. “Because these firms dominated the New 
York metropolitan market, they had to carry excess fluid milk capacity, 
called surplus milk, in order to satisfy demand during the fall and 
winter when farmers produced less milk. The dilemma for the ‘Big 
Three,’ as they were known, was to keep retail milk prices high enough 
to pay for this excess fluid capacity. Smaller dealers, in contrast, car-
ried no surplus and thus could afford to cut prices below that of the 
large dealers. While retail price cutting often offered the small milk 
handlers a competitive advantage, the practice of cutting prices locked 
them into an ongoing price war with the Big Three” (Kriger 1998). 
5 This paper focuses on disorderly marketing in markets for milk. 
Similar conditions hold for many fruits and vegetables which can be 
sold in a non-storable “fresh” form or a storable processed form (such 
as jam). See Calomiris and White (1994). 284    October 2007  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
or can be processed along with the Grade B 
commodity into a storable good. 
▪  A single monopsonistic processor of fluid milk 
buys from farmers and sells facing a down-
ward-sloping demand curve. Cheese processors 
exist in a competitive market. 
▪ Farm-level output has a random element, so it 
is impossible to hit precisely a targeted level of 
farm output.
6 (In reality, the difficulties in 
matching quantity supplied to quantity de-
manded result from fluctuations and uncertain-
ties in both supply and demand; for mathemati-
cal simplicity, the model incorporates all of the 
uncertainty on the supply side.) 
▪  Farmers are risk-averse, but processors are risk-
neutral. (Again, for mathematical simplicity, we 
assume processors are risk-neutral rather than a 
more general assumption that processors are 
better able than farmers to undertake risk.) 
 
  These five aspects are incorporated into the 
model as follows: 
 
  Farmers. Farmers can produce Grade B milk. 
Farmers who choose to produce Grade B milk 
have output of 1+ui, where ui is a random vari-
able with expected value zero, and ui>-1. Pro-
ducers of Grade B milk earn expected utility of 
U . Alternatively, farmers can incur a cost of c 
(higher than the cost of producing Grade B milk) 
and produce Grade A milk. Here too the output is 
1 + ui. For simplicity of exposition, we assume 
that ui is the same for all farmers. We number the 
states 1...I so that u1 < u2 <…< uI, and denote 
the probability of ui as ρi. Farmers are assumed to 
be risk-averse. 
 
  Processors. Farmers who produce Grade A 
milk hope to sell it to a fluid milk processor, or 
bottler. That processor is a monopolist-monop-
sonist who faces a demand curve P = D(Q) and 
who has processing costs (exclusive of the cost of 
the raw milk from farmers) of C(Q). The proces-
sor is risk-neutral. 
 
  Contractual provisions. The processor estab-
lishes the terms of the market by setting N (the 
                                                                                    
6 In reality, milk markets are characterized not only by unpredictabil-
ity of supply and demand, but also by strong patterns of seasonality in 
supply and demand. 
number of Grade A farmers offered contracts), pi 
(the price to be paid in state i), and αi (the per-
centage of Grade A milk produced in state i that 
is processed as fluid milk in state i).
7 
 
  The terms of the optimal contract are deter-
mined by solving the processor’s problem to maxi-
mize expected profit: 
 
  
, Max  [ ( ) ( )],
ii
ii i i i i Np i
DQ Q pQ CQ
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where αi ≤ 1 and pi ≥ 1. The first constraint states 
that farmers must willingly choose to produce the 
Grade A product: they can earn at least as much 
expected utility under the Grade A contract as 
they can producing Grade B. The second con-
straint is that total milk processed by the bottler 
cannot exceed the total amount of Grade A milk 
produced. The third constraint states that the price 
paid by the bottler must be at least as high as the 
price (arbitrarily set at 1) paid by cheese proces-
sors to Grade B producers. 
  We derive in the appendix the characteristics of 
the equilibrium in which at least some Grade A 
product  is  produced.  Characteristics 1, 2, and 5 
from the appendix describe the general form of 
the optimal contract, which is illustrated in Figure 
1. When Grade A supplies are extremely tight 
(farm output is 1 + uk** or less), Grade A price is 
higher than the Grade B price (the price ratio is 
greater than 1), and all Grade A farmers receive 
the higher price (each farmer has a probability of 
1). When Grade A supplies are extremely plenti-
ful (farm output is 1 + uk* or higher), Grade A 
farmers receive the same price as Grade B farm-
ers (the price ratio equals 1). But when output is 
between these two extremes, Grade A milk re-
ceives a higher price than Grade B milk, but only 
some Grade A farmers receive this higher price. It 
is this last case (states between k
** and k
* in the 
                                                                                    
7 Here we assume that there are a large number of producers and that 
the processor purchases α percent of the milk produced by buying the 
entire output of α percent of the producers. The reason for this assump-
tion will be discussed in the next section. Leathers  Orderly Marketing in Agriculture Revisited   285 
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Figure 1. Disorderly Marketing in an Optimal Contract 
 
 
figure) in which conditions prevail that are con-
sistent with those ascribed to “disorderly market-
ing.” There is a price premium for the Grade A 
product, but not all producers of the Grade A 
product are able to sell on the high price market.
8 
[Again, quoting the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture (1873): “[Farmers] are often surprised, if not 
indignant, at having milk returned…while their 
neighbors meet with no such misadventure.”] 
  Although the model here has been presented as 
an explicit contract between the bottler and the N 
Grade A producers, the equilibrium can be at-
tained without explicit contracting if the bottler 
announces state-contingent prices and aggregate 
quantities prior to the farm production decision. If 
fewer than the optimal N farmers choose Grade A 
production, the expected utility of Grade A pro-
ducers will be higher than that of Grade B pro-
ducers, and farmers will enter Grade A produc-
tion. As we will see below, the fact that this can 
                                                                                    
8 In this respect, the marketing conditions described here are similar 
to those observed in labor markets in which labor unemployment oc-
curs without downward adjustments in wages. See Fehr and Falk 
(1999) for a paper in this literature. 
be implemented without transaction costs may 
explain why this kind of contract design domi-
nates other possible contracts. 
  The details of a market with disorderly market-
ing can be seen in a simple numerical example. 
The purposes of the numerical example are (i) to 
illustrate the meaning of the stylized facts, and 
(ii) to show the characteristics of the optimal un-
regulated equilibrium. 
  The stylized facts are incorporated as follows. 
In this example, Grade B milk costs 0.5 to pro-
duce, and can be sold for 1. Milk output per farm 
is shown in Table 1. It is more expensive to pro-
duce Grade A: Grade A milk costs 0.75 to pro-
duce. All farmers are risk-averse: a typical farmer’s 
utility function is U(y) = -2.2 + 5y – y
2. The ex-
pected utility of producing Grade B milk (this is 
 
Table 1. Output in Different States 
State  Output (1 + u) Probability 
1 0.5  0.1 
2 1.0  0.8 
3 1.5  0.1 286    October 2007  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
U  in the above model) is 0. The demand curve 
facing the bottler-processor is PC = 1010 – 10Q 
and processing costs (exclusive of purchases of 
the raw milk) are 10Q. 
  Under these assumptions, the characteristics of 
the unregulated equilibrium are as follows. The 
optimal number of Grade A farmers is 95.34, and 
the purchases and prices in each state are shown 
in Table 2. The characteristics of the optimal con-
tract in each state from the bottler’s point of view 
are shown in Table 3. 
  Several points are worthy of note in this exam-
ple. First, non-price rationing is optimal. In state 
2, the price paid by the bottler exceeds the price 
paid by cheese manufacturers.
9 However, not all 
farmers who produce Grade A milk are able to 
sell to the bottler at the higher price. It is not ra-
tional for the bottler to lower the farm price be-
cause the higher price is necessary to induce farm-
ers to produce the better quality milk needed for 
bottling. In the example, as supplies become more 
plentiful at the farm level, farm prices drop. That 
is not the case for consumer prices, which in-
crease as farm level supplies increase from state 2 
to state 3. The reason is the following: in state 2, 
the bottler accepts more milk than the quantity 
that would maximize profits; the higher quantity 
increases the chance that farmers will participate 
in the higher priced market, and therefore the 
price paid by the bottler drops; in state 3, how-
ever, the price cannot drop any further since the 
bottler must at least meet the competition of 
cheese plants. 
  Second, farm-level prices are a lot more vola-
tile than are consumer prices. On the other hand, 
farm incomes of producers who ship to the bot-
tler are quite stable. Grade A farmers do suffer 
when they are excluded from the market for bot-
tled milk: whenever they ship to cheese plants 
they have lower utility than that of Grade B farm-
ers because the costs of producing Grade A are 
higher. The example illustrates why a farmer 
might perceive these conditions as unfair: in some 
circumstances when producer prices fall consid-
erably, consumer prices are nearly unchanged 
(from state 2 to state 3). In other circumstances, 
                                                                                    
9 In this example, price = 1 in state 3. However, it is easy to construct 
examples (by raising the cost of producing Grade A milk, for example) 
in which the bottler's price exceeds the cheese manufacturer's price in 
every state. It is also easy to show, as well as intuitively obvious, that 
α = 1 in at least one state. 
price increases at the consumer level (the $5.55 
increase when moving from state 2 to state 1) are 
not fully reflected in producer prices (a $1.63 
increase). And in 90 percent of the cases (states 2 
and 3), the farmer who is selling to the bottler 
feels powerless to negotiate a higher price be-
cause there are many other farmers with Grade A 
milk to sell who are being excluded from the fluid 
market. Finally, in this model, consumer markets 
always clear and consumers consume the quantity 
corresponding to the market price on the aggre-
gate demand curve; nevertheless, we can see how 
consumers may perceive a “milk shortage” in 
state 1 (the shortest supply state), since consumer 
prices spike, relative to prices in states 2 or 3. 
 
Market and Regulatory Responses to 
Disorderly Marketing 
 
The previous section shows how an unregulated 
market can result in nonprice rationing consistent 
with the contemporaneous descriptions of “disor-
derly marketing.” Those contemporaneous de-
scriptions were not simply observations; they 
served as an impetus for policy action in the form 
of Federal Market Orders. In this section, we use 
the above model as a basis for exploring two re-
lated questions. First, does the above model entail 
a market failure that government action (such as 
those included in Federal Market Order regula-
tions) can correct? Second, do alternative market-
oriented institutional arrangements exist that would 
improve on the contract presented above without 
requiring any government action? 
  The contract described above illuminates the 
nature of the market imperfection that might exist 
in an unregulated spot market. The processor an-
nounces prices that will prevail in every state of 
production; farmers know that in some states, 
processors will not purchase all available sup-
plies; therefore, farmers, as they make their deci-
sions about whether to produce Grade A or Grade 
B milk, take into account the probability of being 
excluded from the high price fluid market. The 
processor optimally transfers some of the risk 
associated with output levels back to farmers, 
even though the processor is risk-neutral and the 
farmers are risk-averse. This is the essence of the 
market failure, creating a situation in which mar-
keting orders can increase welfare. 
  In particular, the regulatory framework used in 
Federal Milk Orders directly addresses the market Leathers  Orderly Marketing in Agriculture Revisited   287 
 
 
Table 2. Optimal Contract Provisions in Each State 
State  α  P 
Income if Sold 
to Bottler 
Income if Sold 
for Cheese 
Utility if Sold 
to Bottler 
Utility if Sold 
for Cheese 
Utility of Grade 
B Producers 
1 1 2.76  .63  not  relevant 0.553 not  relevant  -0.22 
2 0.5237 1.38  .63  .25  0.553  -1.012  0.04 
3 0.3493  1  1.5  .75  0.725  0.988  0.18 
 
 
Table 3. Prices, Quantities, and Profits in Each State 
State  Quantity Processed  Producer Price  Consumer Price  Profits Plus Fixed Costs 
1 47.67  2.76  523.45  24,337.45 
2 49.93  1.38  500.69  24,431.74 
3 49.95 1 500.5  24,450.53 
 
 
failure identified in the last paragraph. A system 
of “classified pricing and pooling” has been used 
by Federal Milk Orders since their inception in 
the 1930s. Under this system milk processors do 
not pay farmers directly, but pay into a pool ad-
ministered by the Order administrator. The price 
paid by the processor depends on how the proces-
sor uses the milk. A bottler pays a high (“Class 
I”) price; a cheese manufacturer pays a low (“Class 
III”) price.
10 The pool distributes this money by 
paying all Grade A farmers a common (“blend”) 
price.
11 
  This system of classified pricing and pooling 
has the potential for a Pareto improvement over 
the market solution presented above. The pooling 
                                                                                    
10 In a number of respects, the model presented here is a substantial 
simplification of reality. For example: an intermediate Class II price is 
paid by processors of yogurt, ice cream, fluid cream, etc.: butter and 
non-fat dry milk producers pay a Class IV price slightly different from 
the Class III price; payments to individual farmers are adjusted to re-
flect the butterfat and protein content of the milk. 
11 Obviously, administering this classified pricing and pooling system 
is costly, and these costs are financed by a levy on each hundredweight 
of milk regulated (not by general tax revenues). For there to be a true 
welfare gain from the program, these costs must be less than the gain 
shown in the inequality below. It is a fair question to ask why the costs 
associated with the quasi-governmental order program are less than the 
monitoring costs that would allow a bottler to institute alternative 
contract B described in the above section. It may be that firms are more 
open with “government” inspectors (auditors) than with those from 
other private firms; it may be that centralizing the monitoring operation 
in a single regulatory body avoids wasteful duplication of monitoring 
by various private agents. In a more complex and realistic model, 
outputs of each farmer might not be directly observable and might 
require monitoring of shipments to several different processors, mak-
ing monitoring by one processor difficult. This is beyond the scope of 
the present paper. 
provisions eliminate an individual farmer’s risk of 
being excluded from the Grade A market. Hold-
ing all prices and quantities constant for the bot-
tler, the expected utility of Grade A farmers can 
be increased by the pooling of proceeds in each 
state, because farmers are risk-averse (U is con-
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The surplus (difference between left-hand side 
and right-hand side) created by the pooling could 
be distributed among the farmers, consumers, and 
the processor; but the existence of a surplus lends 
credibility to the claim that the Federal Order Pro-
gram is (or can be) beneficial to consumers. 
  The contract described in the previous sec-
tion—in which the processor optimally chooses 
to accept delivery of output from some qualifying 
farmers and to reject delivery from others—is 
consistent with the descriptions of disorderly 
marketing conditions. But we need to explore fur-
ther the possibility that other contract designs 
might evolve to eliminate disorderly marketing. 
In particular, contracts in which the processor 
bears all of the risk would be a preferred alterna-
tive to the “spot market” equilibrium described 
above. It is easy to find theoretical contractual so-
lutions to the disorderly marketing problem. How-
ever, each of these “orderly marketing contracts” 288    October 2007  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
requires some transaction costs—costs associated 
with verification of contract performance. If these 
costs are high enough, the orderly marketing 
contracts will be inferior (from the standpoint of 
the processor) to the disorderly marketing con-
tracts. For the purposes of this paper, it is suffi-
cient to show that disorderly marketing of the 
type described here can exist under some (argua-
bly realistic) circumstances. For the purposes of 
public policy, and the debate about whether Mar-
keting Orders can be economically justified, a 
much more careful evaluation must be made of 
the transaction costs and the economic feasibility 
of alternative orderly marketing contracts. 
  Two alternative contracts are obvious. In the 
first alternative (call it contract X), the processor 
sets α as above, but takes that proportion from 
every producer, rather than taking the entire pro-
duction of α percent of the producers and none of 
the production of the remaining producers. In the 
second alternative (call it contract Y), the proces-
sor pays farmers a flat fee and takes delivery from 
as many farmers as needed to set output at a 
profit-maximizing level. 
  Contract X could be implemented in two ways. 
Grade A farmers could ship all of their milk to the 
bottler, and the bottler could then re-ship the ex-
cess milk to a cheese manufacturer. It is easy to 
see how high transportation costs could make this 
alternative impractical. Or, the bottler could con-
tact all Grade A farmers and inform each farmer 
how much milk to ship to the bottler. This too in-
volves costly record-keeping and communication. 
A modified approach
12 would have farmers ship 
to the bottler or the cheese plant, as directed by 
the bottler, and would have payment made from 
the cheese plant to the bottler. 
  Contract Y requires monitoring of quality of 
output for farmers who do not ship to the bottler. 
In the example of the last section, in states 2 and 
3 there are many farmers who produce Grade A 
who do not ship to the bottler. Contract Y would 
have the bottler pay a fixed payment to all N 
farmers, regardless of whether their milk was 
                                                                                    
12 A system like this is used in some fresh produce markets where a 
single collector gathers farm produce from multiple farmers and then 
makes multiple sales to different users. Here too, the fact that such an 
arrangement did not emerge in milk markets is attributable to the size 
of transaction costs. The existence of a three-way contract between the 
bottler, cheese plant, and dairy farmer, complicates enforcement by cre-
ating incentives for any two of these to collude against the third. 
shipped to the bottler or not. Without monitoring, 
Grade B farmers could falsely claim that they 
were non-shipping Grade A farmers, and could 
request payment from the bottler. If the cost of 
this monitoring is sufficiently high, the Contract 
Y alternative will also be impractical. Neither of 
these contract forms have been observed in the 
real world, and there are two likely reasons: since 
the 1930s the Federal Order program has made 
private contracts such as these unnecessary; prior 
to the 1930s it seems likely that transaction costs 
made these infeasible. However, as this discus-
sion of alternative contracts and transaction costs 
makes clear, the model above does not prove that 
disorderly marketing is an inevitable condition. 
As the structure of transaction costs changes, these 
alternative contracts may serve as a free-market 
(or non-governmental) solution to disorderly mar-
keting. For example, a reliable publicly funded 
system of certifying Grade A farmers would sub-
stantially reduce transaction costs associated with 
contracts like Contract Y. 
  A final non-regulatory solution to disorderly 
marketing might be the development of a classi-
fied pricing and pooling system operated by a 
marketing cooperative without government assis-
tance. Cooperative marketing was the first solu-
tion proposed to the disorderly marketing prob-
lem. A cooperative of all Grade A producers in an 
area could be formed to undertake the pooling 
function, with all members of the cooperative re-
ceiving the same price regardless of how any in-
dividual’s milk was sold. 
  The above model gives insight into the reason 
why cooperative bargaining alone cannot achieve 
the same welfare gains as the Marketing Order 
program. Such an arrangement is inherently un-
stable. Any one member of the cooperative has an 
incentive to break with the cooperative and bar-
gain separately with the bottler. The bottler is 
able to offer that farmer a contract with a price 
well below the price the bottler pays to the coop-
erative, but with an assurance that that farmer will 
always ship to the bottler (α = 1 in all states). The 
farmer will accept the offer as long as the price is 
above the pooled price paid by the cooperative to 
its members. 
  In fact, this describes the historical experience 
of marketing cooperatives before the advent of 
Marketing Orders. As described by Mortensen 
(1940), “In the early 1920’s producers selling Leathers  Orderly Marketing in Agriculture Revisited   289 
 
 
fluid milk to cities had organized…effective pro-
ducers’ associations whose primary function was 
to bargain with city milk distributors [bottlers] for 
the farm price to be paid for milk sold for fluid 
consumption. In 1931 and 1932...the situation 
became more difficult to control. The dairy farmer 
who had been selling his product to creameries 
[butter manufacturers], cheese factories, or con-
denseries for manufacturing purposes…[began] 
distributing it directly to consumers in fluid form 
or…selling it through a milk distributor” (Mort-
ensen 1940, pp. 5–6). A contemporaneous account 
describes the breakdown of cooperatives as fol-
lows: “By 1933, the well organized fluid milk 
markets were confronted with serious problems 
as a result of surplus milk seeping into the cities 
to undercut prices set by the organized interests 
controlling the regular markets” (Garver and Tre-
logan 1936, p. 610). Kriger (1998) describes the 
failure of cooperatives to solve the disorderly 
marketing problem in the New York City area, 
which ultimately led to “milk strikes”—with farm-




The stated purpose of the Federal Market Order 
program was not simply to raise farm prices; it 
also was intended to reduce or eliminate “disor-
derly marketing conditions.” Modern economic 
analyses of marketing orders have by and large 
ignored the possibility that an inherent market 
failure (these “disorderly marketing conditions”) 
may exist and may be an economic justification 
for the existence of marketing orders. This paper 
explores that possibility by developing a model 
with the following characteristics: (i) the com-
modity is produced by risk-averse farmers in dif-
ferent qualities, with higher quality being more 
costly to produce; (ii) the commodity is not stor-
able in its high quality form; (iii) the processor of 
the high quality form has monopoly-monopsony 
power; and (iv) farm output is stochastic so that it 
is impossible to match actual farm output with a 
target quantity for processing. 
  Under these conditions, the optimal choices of 
the processor (expressed as an explicit contract 
offered to farmers or as implicit understanding of 
the equilibrium conditions by farmers, which 
leads to a “spot market” equilibrium) have char-
acteristics that may be perceived as disorderly 
marketing conditions: non-price rationing occurs 
in the sense that some farmers who are willing to 
sell to the higher price market are excluded from 
that market; this fact makes it more difficult for 
farmers to act collectively; resulting farm prices 
are more voluble than are consumer prices. This 
model also helps explain why marketing orders 
use classified pricing and pooling as a regulatory 
mechanism and why voluntary cooperative ar-
rangements by farmers may be inherently unsta-
ble in the absence of a regulatory framework. 
  The modern literature on imperfect information 
gives us insight into the perceived problem of 
“disorderly marketing” that led to the adoption of 
the Federal Milk Market Order program. The 
classified pricing and pooling provisions create a 
regulatory solution that is superior to the “free 
market” outcome. Although superior “free mar-
ket” or unregulated contracting solutions exist in 
principle, whether or not the market would sup-
port these alternative solutions in the absence of 
marketing orders depends on transaction costs 
associated with alternative contracts. Economic 
studies of marketing orders should recognize the 
possibility of inherent market failure and should 
be more cautious about assuming that the un-
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Mathematical Derivation of Characteristics of 
an Optimal Contract 
 
Recall from the text that ui is the random compo-
nent of production in state i, ρi is the probability 
of state i, N is the total number of farmers offered 
the contract, Qi is aggregate output in state i, pi is 
the price paid under the contract in state i, αi is 
the percentage of the aggregate commodity that is 
bought by the processor (or, described differently, 
αi is the probability that an individual farmer will 
participate in the higher priced Grade A market), 
c is the farmer’s additional cost of producing 
Grade A output, C is the processing cost function, 
D is consumer demand for the processed good, 
and  U  is the reservation level of utility that is 
earned by a farmer who produces Grade B output. 
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where λ, µi, and νi are Lagrangian multipliers as-
sociated with the constraints. 
 The  first-order  conditions associated with the 
above are 
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In addition, the constraints require 
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The participation constraint (A4) must be bind-
ing. If not, the processor could increase expected 
profits by reducing payments to farmers in some 
states. Also, from (A4) and from the fact that c is 
greater than the cost of producing Grade B, it is 
obvious that pi > 1 in at least one state. 
  The characteristics of the equilibrium in which 
at least some Grade A product is produced can be 
derived from the complementary slackness con-
ditions listed above. 
 
Characteristic 1. Let k be a state in which pk = 1. 
For all states j > k, pj = 1. 
 
PROOF. pk = 1 and νk ≥ 0 implies 
   '[ ( 1 ) ] kk
N
Up u c +− ≤
λ
. 
For j > k, since pj ≥ pk = 1, 
 
     pj(1 + uj) – c > pk(1 + uk) – c, 
 
and so under risk aversion, 
   ' [ (1 ) ] '[ (1 ) ] , jj kk
N




requiring νj > 0. 
 
Characteristic 2. Define k* as the largest state in 
which price is greater than 1 (so p1… pk* are greater 
than 1 and pk*+1, …, pI = 1). Farm income for 
farmers shipping to the processor is the same in 
all states 1 … k*. 
 
PROOF. From (A3), in all states where νj = 0, 
 
   '[ ( 1 ) ] jj
N




Therefore, farm income [pj(1+uj)–c]≡y
* is the 
same in all of these states. 
 
Characteristic 3. Define k* as in Characteristic 2. 
For j > k*, either processor profits are maximized 
in that state, or ψj > 0 and αj = 1. 
 
PROOF. For j > k*, pj = 1, and (A2) becomes 
 
    (1 ) j jj i Nu ρψ +≤ µ . 
 
For this to hold, either ψj = µi = 0, which means 
 








(i.e., profits are maximized in the state), or ψj ≥ 0 
and µi > 0, which means αj = 1. (Since ψ is de-
creasing in Q, when ψ > 0, setting α = 1 moves 
the firm as close as possible to profit-maximiza-
tion within the state.) 
 
Characteristic 4. In states i ≤ k*, either αi = 1 or 
ψi (evaluated at αi = 1) < 0. 
 
PROOF. From (A2), 
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The left-hand side is positive, since pi > 1. There-
fore, ψi < 0 or µi > 0. 292    October 2007  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Characteristic 5. Suppose that for some state j, 
αj < 1. Then αi < 1 for all states i > j. 
 
PROOF A. If j > k* (as defined above), then from 
αj < 1 and (A2), we know that ψj (uj, αj < 1) ≤ 0, 
so ψj (αj = 1) < 0, and ψi (αi = 1) < 0 for any 
state i>j. Therefore, as described in Characteris-
tic 3, αi = 1 cannot be optimal. 
 
PROOF B. If j = k*, then αj < 1 implies ψj (αj = 1) 
≤ 0 from Characteristic 4; therefore, ψi (αi = 1) < 
0 for i > j and Characteristic 3 implies αi < 1. 
 
PROOF C. If j < k*, then αi < 1 for all j ≤ i ≤ k*. 
To show this, αj < 1 implies µj = 0, and (A2) is 
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Suppose there is some i in the range defined so 
that αi = 1. For this i, (A2) is 
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Since i > j and αi > αj, then ψi < ψj < 0, and 
ψi(1+ ui) < ψj (1 + uj) < 0. Since both i and j are 
less than or equal to k*, pi(1+ ui) – c = pj(1 + uj) 
– c by Characteristic 2. 
  Subtracting (A5) from (A6) yields 
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Both terms on the left-hand side are negative, but 
the right-hand side is positive, creating a contra-
diction, therefore αi < 1. 
 
PROOF D. Combining proof parts (B) and (A) with 




   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 